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I
n the early 1960s the Federal Reserve (Fed) was little known outside of the
ﬁnancial services industry and university economics departments. Twenty
years later Fed Chairman Paul Volcker was one of the most recognized
names in American public life. Now hardly a week goes by when the Fed
is not featured prominently in the business news. The Fed was thrust into
the limelight in the intervening years when the public came to associate it
with inﬂation-ﬁghting policy actions that raised interest rates and weakened
economic activity. Even though inﬂation has been held in check since the mid-
1980s, the public remains acutely aware of Fed policy today.
Monetary economists and central bankers alike now understand that effec-
tive monetary policy must be built on a consistent commitment to low inﬂation.
That is why in recent years the Fed has made low inﬂation a particularly high
priority. The large fraction of the public having ﬁrst-hand experience with high
inﬂation naturally supports the view that inﬂation must be contained. As the
collective memory of inﬂation fades, however, public support for low inﬂation
will become increasingly difﬁcult to sustain. A permanent national commitment
to price stability requires that citizens personally unfamiliar with the trauma of
high inﬂation understand the rationale for price stability and the tactical policy
actions needed to maintain it.
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appeared in this Bank’s 1996 Annual Report, beneﬁted greatly from the comments of Doug
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This article reviews the history of U.S. monetary policy in the 20th century
with the aim of providing that understanding. It identiﬁes mistakes that led to
high and volatile inﬂation, lessons learned from the experience, and principles
applied in the pursuit of low inﬂation today. U.S. monetary policy came of age
in the 20th century in the sense that the country left the strict rules of the gold
standard for the freedom of an inconvertible paper standard, which the Fed
only slowly and painfully learned to manage. What follows is the story of that
20th century odyssey.
Section 1 discusses monetary policy under the gold standard and the cir-
cumstances that led to the founding of the Fed. Section 2 outlines the main
conceptual obstacles that had to be overcome in order to manage monetary
policy under a paper standard. The causes and disruptive consequences of
inﬂationary policy at mid-century are discussed in Section 3.
Certain key theoretical and practical developments paved the way for the
Fed to take responsibility for controlling inﬂation in the early 1980s. Section
4 covers these developments. Progress in the theory of the demand for and the
supply of money as well as empirical evidence supporting the theory played
key roles here. The failure of nonmonetary approaches to controlling inﬂation
was also important. The recognition that a credible Fed commitment to price
stability could minimize the unemployment cost of achieving low inﬂation also
played a role.
Section 5 recommends that the Fed be given a legislative mandate for low
inﬂation. The case is based on lessons learned in the inﬂationary 1960s, ’70s,
and early ’80s, and on the principles that have been applied successfully to
maintain low inﬂation since then. The closing section summarizes the monetary
policy lessons learned on the 20th century odyssey.
1. MONETARY POLICY UNDER THE GOLD STANDARD
When the Federal Reserve was established in 1913, inﬂation was not the prob-
lem it was to become in the latter part of the century. The nation was on a gold
standard and the purchasing power of money in 1913 was about what it had
been 30 years before, or for that matter, 100 years before. The gold standard
sharply restricted inﬂation by requiring that money created by the U.S. Treasury
be backed by gold.1
The classical gold standard yielded price stability only to the extent that
the Treasury’s stock of monetary gold happened to expand at a rate sufﬁcient
1 Technically, the United States was on a bimetallic (gold and silver) standard until 1900.
Though it is true that the money supply was limited by the size of the Treasury’s gold and silver
holdings, there was considerable short-run variability in the money multiplier. See Cagan (1965)
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to satisfy the economy’s demand for money at stable prices. For instance, slow
growth in the gold supply caused the price level to decline at over 1 percent
per year from 1879 to 1897, and gold discoveries and new mining techniques
caused inﬂation to average over 2 percent per year between 1897 and 1914.
Nevertheless, by the standard of what was to come, the variation of inﬂation
was very small.
Although the economy grew rapidly throughout the gold standard years,
the period was marked by a number of recessions associated with temporary
deﬂations and substantial interest rate movements. Sudden sustained short-term
interest rate spikes of over 10 percentage points occurred on eight occasions
between the Civil War and the founding of the Federal Reserve. Five of these
spikes were associated with bank runs characterized by a demand to convert
bank deposits into currency that could not be satisﬁed by the fractional cash
reserves held by banks.2
Finally, in response to the banking panic of 1907 and the ensuing recession,
the nation was no longer willing to run monetary policy entirely according to
the classical gold standard rules. The Federal Reserve was established in the
United States with the power to create currency and bank reserves at least
somewhat independently of the nation’s monetary gold. The Fed was given
authority to create currency and reserves by making loans to banks through its
discount window or by acquiring securities in the money market. The Fed’s
mission was to provide an elastic supply of money to smooth short-term interest
rates against liquidity disturbances, while preserving the link between money
and gold in the long run in order to restrain inﬂation.3
Through its dominant presence in the market for currency and bank re-
serves, the Fed easily gained control of short-term interest rates and eliminated
the kind of interest rate spikes seen earlier.4 By smoothing short-term interest
rates, however, the Fed was obliged to substitute its discretionary manage-
ment of short rates for the impersonal market forces that had determined rates
previously. The Bank of England had successfully managed short rates for
decades in the context of the classical gold standard.5 And the Fed could have
followed similar gold standard operating procedures. However, the classical
gold standard collapsed with World War I, and the nation was never willing to
support Fed procedures geared to defending the gold standard. The Fed was left
without clear operational procedures for positioning short-term interest rates to
stabilize economic activity around full employment with stable prices.
2 Major banking panics occurred in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907.
3 This latter understanding was viewed as part of the Fed’s mission, although it is only
implicitly, not explicitly, stated in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 itself.
4 See Goodfriend (1988).
5 See Hawtrey (1938).4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. THE OBSTACLES TO UNDERSTANDING
MONETARY POLICY
Improvements in monetary policy that seemed within reach after the founding of
the Fed proved elusive. The 1930s saw the sharpest deﬂation, the worst banking
crisis, and the longest and deepest economic depression in American history.6
Then, beginning in the mid-1960s there were two decades of unprecedented
peacetime inﬂation that tripled the general price level by the early 1980s.7
Why has it taken so long for the Fed to give price stability pride of place?8
Initially, there was a tendency to underestimate the disruptive potential of inﬂa-
tion and a willingness to be tolerant of each new burst of inﬂation in the hope
that it would soon die down. Such hope seemed reasonable since protracted
peacetime inﬂation had never before been a problem in the United States.
Another difﬁculty was that it took some time for economists to develop a
framework capable of understanding monetary policy in the absence of a link
to gold. Prior to the 20th century the world had little practical experience with
monetary regimes in which money was unbacked by a commodity such as
gold or silver. With some exceptions, mainly during wartime, there was little
empirical evidence on such regimes and little interest in analyzing them.
The main problem was confusion within the economics profession about
the determination of the general price level and the control of inﬂation in a
regime of inconvertible paper money.9 There was also little understanding of
the role played by inﬂation expectations in the wage- and price-setting process
and in the determination of interest rates. Finally, the relationship between
unemployment and inﬂation was seriously misunderstood. The resolution of
these disputes provided the foundation for today’s monetary policy success.
3. INFLATIONARY MONETARY POLICY
AT MID-CENTURY
Largely as a result of the nation’s unfortunate experience with inﬂation in
the period from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, monetary economists
6 According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) U.S. real net national product fell by more than
one-third from 1929 to 1933, implicit prices of goods and services fell by more than one-quarter,
and wholesale prices by more than one-third. More than one-ﬁfth of the commercial banks in the
United States holding nearly one-tenth of the deposits closed because of ﬁnancial difﬁculties. As
a result of the sharp contraction in economic activity, the unemployment rate peaked at over 20
percent in 1932–33, and remained above 10 percent for the remainder of the decade.
7 The Fed had already recognized inﬂation as a problem on three occasions prior to the
mid-1960s: in the aftermath of World War II, during the Korean War and the period of the 1951
Fed-Treasury Accord, and again in the mid-1950s. See footnote 12.
8 Under the leadership of Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the Fed made price stability a priority brieﬂy in the 1920s. See Hetzel (1985).
9 See, for example, Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963) and Friedman (1987).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Comes of Age 5
and central bankers now understand that the costs of inﬂationary monetary
policy are signiﬁcant and varied. First are the costs that even a steady, per-
fectly anticipated inﬂation imposes on society. Then there are the disruptive
and destabilizing costs of unstable inﬂation, more difﬁcult to quantify but sub-
stantial nonetheless. These latter costs stemmed from alternating expansionary
and contractionary policy actions. Speciﬁcally, there was a tendency—known
as go-stop monetary policy—for the Fed to exacerbate the cyclical volatility of
inﬂation and unemployment. And there was a related tendency to produce rising
inﬂation and increasingly volatile inﬂation expectations over time. The forces
giving rise to these tendencies are identiﬁed and described below together with
their disruptive consequences.
The Cost of Steady Inﬂation
The cost of steady inﬂation begins with the fact that a steadily falling purchas-
ing power of money causes people to hold less cash than they would if prices
were stable. Attempts to economize on money holdings manifest themselves
in several ways. Banks invest in teller machines, people visit banks or teller
machines more frequently, businesses devote more time and effort to managing
their cash balances, etc.10 Even more important, individuals and ﬁrms take
steps to protect the value of their savings and investments against loss due to
inﬂation. The effort and resources devoted to dealing with inﬂation are wasted
from society’s point of view in the sense that they could be better employed
in producing goods and services.
Another major cost of steady inﬂation stems from the incomplete indexa-
tion of the tax system. The biggest problem in this regard results because taxes
are assessed on nominal interest earnings and nominal capital gains, that is, on
investment returns in dollars. Inﬂation causes nominal returns to rise because
investors demand compensation for the declining purchasing power of money.
For instance, long-term bond rates contain a premium for expected inﬂation
over the life of the bond. Since nominal returns are taxed as income, however,
inﬂation reduces the after-tax return to saving and investment and thereby tends
to inhibit capital accumulation and economic growth.11
10 Estimates in Lucas (1994) imply that the economization of money balances that occurred
at a rate of inﬂation of 5 percent per year (associated with a short-term nominal interest rate of
about 6 percent) wasted about 1 percent of U.S. GDP. The payment of interest on transactions
deposits in recent years raises money balances and reduces this welfare cost somewhat. The bulk
of the welfare gain to reducing inﬂation is probably realized at a slightly positive inﬂation rate.
See Wolman (1997).
11 Feldstein (1996) reports that the net present value of the welfare gain of shifting from
2 percent inﬂation per year to price stability forever is about 30 percent of the current level of
GDP.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Go-Stop Monetary Policy12
A central bank such as the Fed that is charged with conducting monetary policy
on a discretionary basis is naturally inclined to give considerable weight to the
public’s mood. Go-stop monetary policy was, in good part, a consequence of
the Fed’s inclination to be responsive to the shifting balance of public concerns
between inﬂation and unemployment. Of course, difﬁculties in judging the
strength of the economy and in gauging inﬂationary pressures compounded the
problem, as did ignorance of the lags in the effect of policy.
For the most part the public tolerated inﬂation as long as it was low,
steady, and predictable. When labor markets were slack, the public was even
willing to risk higher inﬂation in order to stimulate additional economic activity.
Only when economic activity was strong and inﬂation moved well above the
prevailing trend did inﬂation top the list of public concerns.
It is easy to understand why inﬂation need not greatly concern the public
when it is steady and predictable. Individuals and ﬁrms are inconvenienced
only slightly by steady inﬂation. As long as wages, prices, and asset values
move up in tandem, there are no big ﬁnancial consequences, especially when
inﬂation is low. Likewise, a temporary and modest increase of inﬂation around
a low, well-established trend need not immediately arouse concerns.
However, a persistent departure of inﬂation above trend causes anxieties
because people wonder where a new trend might be established. Investors
worry about how much of an inﬂation premium to demand in interest rates;
businesses worry about how aggressively to price in order to cover rising costs;
and workers worry about maintaining the purchasing power of their wages.
In marked contrast to inﬂation, which affects all, unemployment actually
affects relatively few at a given time. The unemployment rate in recent decades
has risen at most to only about 10 percent of the labor force. The public is
concerned about unemployment not so much because of those who are currently
unemployed but because people are afraid of becoming unemployed. It follows
that the public is generally more concerned about unemployment when the
unemployment rate is rising, even if it is still low, than when it is falling, even
if it is already high.
The above-mentioned reasoning helps explain why the Fed produced go-
stop monetary policy in the 1960s and ’70s. In retrospect, one observes the
following pattern of events.
12 Friedman (1964, 1972, and 1984) discusses go-stop policy. Romer and Romer (1989)
document that since World War II the Fed tightened monetary policy decisively to ﬁght inﬂation
on six occasions beginning, respectively, in October 1947, September 1955, December 1968, April
1974, August 1978, and October 1979. The unemployment rate rose sharply after each policy
shock. Only two signiﬁcant increases in unemployment were not preceded by Fed action to ﬁght
inﬂation. One occurred in 1954 after the Korean War and the second occurred in 1961, after the
Fed tightened monetary policy to improve the international balance of payments.M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Comes of Age 7
First, because inﬂation became a major concern only after it clearly moved
above its previous trend, the Fed did not tighten policy early enough to preempt
inﬂationary outbursts before they became a problem.
Second, by the time the public became sufﬁciently concerned about inﬂa-
tion for the Fed to act, pricing decisions had already begun to embody higher
inﬂation expectations. Thus delayed, a given degree of restraint on inﬂation
required a more aggressive increase in short-term interest rates with greater
risk of recession.
Third, in any cyclical episode there was a relatively narrow window of
broad public support for the Fed to tighten monetary policy. The window
opened after inﬂation was widely recognized as the major concern and closed
when tighter monetary policy caused the unemployment rate to begin to rise.
Often the Fed did not take full advantage of a window of opportunity to raise
short rates, because it wanted more conﬁrmation that higher short-term rates
were required.
Fourth, it was probably easier for the Fed to maintain public support for
ﬁghting inﬂation with prolonged rather than preemptive tightening. A more
gradual lowering of interest rates in the later stage of a recession was a less
visible means of ﬁghting inﬂation than raising rates more sharply earlier. Once
unemployment peaked and began to fall, the public’s anxiety about it dimin-
ished. Prolonged tightening was attractive as an inﬂation-ﬁghting measure in
spite of the fact that it probably lengthened the “stop” phase of the policy cycle.
Rising Inﬂation and Unstable Inﬂation Expectations
Over time, deliberately expansionary monetary policy in the “go” phase of the
policy cycle came to be anticipated by workers and ﬁrms. Workers learned
to take advantage of tight labor markets to make higher wage demands, and
ﬁrms took advantage of tight product markets to pass along higher costs in
higher prices. Increasingly aggressive wage- and price-setting behavior tended
to neutralize the favorable employment effects of expansionary policy. And the
Fed became evermore expansionary on average in its pursuit of low unem-
ployment, causing correspondingly higher inﬂation and inﬂation expectations.
Lenders demanded unprecedented inﬂation premia in long-term bond rates. And
the absence of a long-run anchor for inﬂation caused inﬂation expectations and
long bond rates to ﬂuctuate widely.13
The breakdown of mutual understanding between the markets and the Fed
greatly inhibited the conduct of monetary policy. The Fed continued to manage
closely short-term nominal interest rates.14 But the result of an interest rate
13 The monthly average 30-year bond rate rose from around 8 percent in early 1978 to peak
above 14 percent in the fall of 1981. The long bond rate was near 13 percent as late as the
summer of 1984.
14 See Cook (1989).8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
policy action is largely determined by its effect on the real interest rate, which
is the nominal rate minus the public’s expected rate of inﬂation. And the Fed
found it increasingly difﬁcult to estimate the public’s inﬂation expectations and
to predict how its policy actions might inﬂuence those expectations. Compound-
ing the problem, enormous increases in short-term interest rates were required
by the early 1980s to stabilize the economy. Stabilization policy became more
difﬁcult because the public could not predict what a given policy action implied
for the future, and consequently, the Fed could not predict how the economy
would respond to its policy actions.
4. THE CONTROL OF INFLATION:
DISINFLATION IN THE 1980S
By the late 1970s, policymakers and monetary economists had come to un-
derstand the costly and disruptive features of inﬂation discussed above. With
considerable public support, the Fed under the leadership of Chairman Paul
Volcker initiated the great disinﬂation in October 1979, marking the beginning
of the period in which the Fed would make lowering inﬂation a priority. What
followed was a tightening of monetary policy that succeeded in bringing the
inﬂation rate down permanently for the ﬁrst time in the post–Korean War pe-
riod, ﬁrst from over 10 percent to around 4 percent by 1983, and then to around
3 percent by the mid-1990s.
This section reviews three developments that paved the way for the Fed
to take responsibility for price stability. Most important was the progress that
economists made in understanding money demand and supply. Next was the
failure of nonmonetary approaches to controlling inﬂation. Finally, and to a
lesser extent, was the idea advanced by monetary economists that the un-
employment cost of disinﬂation might be minimized if the disinﬂation were
credible.
The Central Bank’s Responsibility for Inﬂation
The consensus among monetary economists that central banks are responsible
for inﬂation is built on both theory and evidence. Above all, there is the sub-
stantial body of evidence from the inﬂationary experiences of a great many
nations, including the widespread inﬂation in the industrialized world during
the 1960s and ’70s, showing that sustained inﬂation is always associated with
excessive money growth. The evidence also clearly indicates that inﬂation is
stopped by slowing the growth of the money supply.15
15 See, for instance, Friedman (1987), Poole (1978), and Sargent (1986).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Comes of Age 9
The theory of money demand and supply supports the cross-country evi-
dence by illuminating the mechanics of the link between monetary policy and
inﬂation. The theory of money demand implies that control of the money supply
is necessary and sufﬁcient to control the trend rate of inﬂation. And the theory
of money supply implies that a central bank can control the trend rate of money
growth. As will become clear below, money demand may be thought of as the
fulcrum by which a central bank controls inﬂation, and the money supply may
be thought of as the lever by which it does so.
Money Demand
The theory of money demand asserts that individuals and businesses choose to
hold a target stock of money that is proportional to their expenditures, a target
that balances the convenience of holding money against the foregone interest
earnings.16 The key implication of money demand theory for monetary policy
is that there is a reasonably stable long-run relationship between a nation’s
demand for money and its production and exchange of goods and services.
It follows that sustained inﬂation results when the growth of the nation’s
money stock exceeds the rate of growth of the nation’s physical product.17
Prices must rise in this case because otherwise individuals and ﬁrms would
spend their growing excess money balances. Since one person’s expenditure is
another person’s receipts, the spending would put upward pressure on prices
until the inﬂation rate matched the rate of money growth in excess of the
growth of output. Only then would the ongoing increase in the stock of money
be willingly absorbed by the public.
The theory of money demand also implies that the overall price level can-
not move very much over the long run if the stock of money grows in tandem
with the growth of output.18 If an inﬂation were to start, it would reduce the
purchasing power of a given nominal stock of money and cause individuals
and businesses to cut their spending in an effort to maintain their inventory of
monetary purchasing power. With no additional money balances forthcoming
in the aggregate, the downward pressure on spending would stop the inﬂation.
Money Supply
The nation’s basic money supply consists of currency and checkable deposits
held by households and businesses. A central bank can control the former
16 See McCallum and Goodfriend (1987).
17 The public’s target ratio of money to expenditure may exhibit a trend at times in response
to, say, rising interest rates or technical progress in the payments system. For instance, the ratio of
money to expenditure will trend downward if money provides transaction services more efﬁciently
over time. In that case, the money growth rate consistent with price stability will be below the
growth of physical product.
18 See the preceding note.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
because it has a monopoly on the creation of currency.19 Checkable deposits
are created by banks. A central bank also has the power to control checkable
deposits because banks must hold reserves to service their deposits, and a
central bank controls the aggregate stock of bank reserves.20
The ﬁnancial services industry has long been creating new instruments
in which the public can hold liquid balances, e.g., certiﬁcates of deposit and
money market mutual funds. New ﬁnancial instruments usually do not add to
the basic money supply since they are only imperfect substitutes for currency
or checkable deposits.21 Nevertheless, the introduction of money substitutes
has adversely affected the predictability of money demand in the short run.
In practice, however, money demand is sufﬁciently stable and money supply
sufﬁciently controllable over time, so that ﬁnancial innovations do not funda-
mentally alter a central bank’s power over inﬂation.22
Failed Approaches to Controlling Inﬂation
A variety of nonmonetary approaches to controlling inﬂation were tried in the
1960s and ’70s. In the United States, for example, the federal government
published voluntary wage-price guidelines at various times to persuade ﬁrms
and workers to forego price and wage increases deemed excessive.23 Actual
controls were imposed for a few years in the early ’70s but for the most part
they were lifted by the mid-’70s.24 By the end of the period, both controls and
guidelines came to be regarded as arbitrary, unfair, and ineffective. Moreover,
where they were effective they often created allocative disruptions, e.g., price
controls in the energy sector created shortages and long lines at gas stations.
In the early 1960s economists believed that budget policy might play a
key role in ﬁghting inﬂation. In the United States, however, it quickly became
clear in the Vietnam War period that political concerns would immobilize ﬁscal
policy as a practical economic policy tool. Moreover, it later became clear that
19 Electronic private substitutes for government currency have become feasible recently. See
Lacker (1996).
20 See Cagan (1965).
21 There have been exceptions, however. For instance, a new deposit type known as the
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account was introduced in the late ’70s and early ’80s as
part of the deregulation of the prohibition of interest on checkable deposits. NOW accounts were
interest-earning substitutes for demand deposits and so were immediately included in the Fed’s
M1 measure of the basic money supply for purposes of targeting and control. See Broaddus and
Goodfriend (1984).
22 For instance, see Lucas (1988) and Meltzer (1963) on the long-run stability of the demand
for M1.
23 See Heller (1966) and Shultz and Aliber (1966).
24 See Kosters (1975).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Comes of Age 11
the inﬂation of the 1970s was not closely related to the government’s ﬁscal
situation.25
Even after the Fed under Chairman Volcker had begun its momentous
disinﬂation, the Carter administration imposed credit controls in early 1980
in an effort to foster the process. The credit control program caused a sharp
recession with little impact on inﬂation and was phased out at midyear.26
Thus did policymakers learn the hard way that policies for stopping inﬂa-
tion other than monetary control didn’t work. As much as anything else, the
failure of nonmonetary approaches to disinﬂation set the stage for the Fed to
take responsibility for bringing inﬂation down.
Credibility for Low Inﬂation and the Unemployment Cost of Disinﬂation
In the early 1960s policymakers were inclined to accept the inﬂationary conse-
quences of policy actions taken to stimulate aggregate demand and employment.
That inclination was based to a great extent on evidence of a century-long neg-
ative Phillips curve correlation between unemployment and (wage) inﬂation
in the United Kingdom that appeared to offer a trade-off in which the bene-
ﬁts of lower inﬂation would have to be balanced against the costs of higher
unemployment.27
When stimulative policy succeeded in driving down the unemployment
rate in the ’60s, the resulting increase in inﬂation at ﬁrst seemed consistent
with a stable Phillips curve trade-off; and the rising inﬂation was tolerated as
a necessary evil.28 In the 1970s, however, the Phillips curve correlation broke
down as inﬂation and unemployment both moved higher, and it became clear
that high inﬂation could not buy permanently low unemployment.29
Even though protracted inﬂation was widely understood by the late 1970s
to have costs with no offsetting beneﬁts, it was recognized that bringing in-
ﬂation down would be costly too. Previous experience with go-stop policy
made it clear that there was a short-run trade-off between unemployment and
inﬂation.30 Policymakers expected the temporary unemployment cost of a large
permanent disinﬂation to exceed the costs of earlier disinﬂations that the Fed
had produced in the “stop” phase of its policy cycles.
25 Government ﬁscal concerns are the driving force behind high inﬂations. See Sargent
(1986).
26 See Schreft (1990).
27 See Phillips (1958).
28 See Heller (1966) and Tobin (1972).
29 See Fischer (1994), pp. 267–68.
30 King and Watson (1994), for example, report a signiﬁcant negative correlation between
unemployment and inﬂation over the business cycle.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
To some degree a view then emerging in the academic community might
have encouraged the Fed to pursue the disinﬂation. The view holds that the
unemployment cost of disinﬂation can be minimized if a disinﬂation policy is
credible. The idea that credibility would govern the costliness of disinﬂation
has since become widely accepted in theory.31 The acquisition and maintenance
of credibility for low inﬂation have become major practical concerns of Fed
policymakers and central bankers around the world.
The idea underlying the role of credibility is that wage- and price-setting
behavior is geared to expectations of money growth. The Fed supports the
ongoing inﬂation as long as money grows in excess of output. If the Fed’s dis-
inﬂation is credible, the Fed slows money growth and wage and price inﬂation
come down, too, with little effect on employment. On the other hand, if the
disinﬂation is not credible, then wage and price inﬂation continues as before.
If the Fed persists in slowing money growth anyway, a deﬁciency of aggregate
demand causes unemployment as households and businesses cut spending in
an attempt to maintain their targeted monetary purchasing power.32
In practice, however, disinﬂation is nearly always costly because credibility
for low inﬂation is hard to acquire after it has been compromised. Moreover, a
central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation is only as credible as the public’s
support for it. The Fed probably embarked on the disinﬂation in 1979, in part,
because the public ﬁnally seemed ready to accept it.
Although its discount rate changes often made the headlines prior to 1979,
the Fed rarely sought publicity for its monetary policy actions. Chairman
Volcker broke sharply with tradition by initiating the period of disinﬂation-
ary policy with a high-proﬁle announcement signaling that the Fed would
take responsibility for inﬂation and bring it down.33 In so doing, Chairman
Volcker built credibility by staking his own reputation and the Fed’s on
31 Barro and Gordon (1983), Fellner (1976), Sargent (1986), and Taylor (1982) contain early
discussions of credibility as it relates to monetary policy. Persson and Tabellini (1994) contains
a recent survey of research on the role of credibility in monetary and ﬁscal policy. The new
large-scale Federal Reserve Board macroeconomic model is designed to take account of different
degrees of credibility in policy simulations. See “A Guide to FRB/US” (1996).
32 What happens is this: In the ﬁrst instance households and businesses attempt to exchange
ﬁnancial assets for money. Such actions, however, cannot satisfy the aggregate excess demand
for money directly. They drive asset prices down and interest rates up until the interest sensitive
components of aggregate expenditure grow slowly enough to eliminate the excess demand for
money. As the disinﬂation gains credibility, wage and price inﬂation slows, and real aggregate
demand rebounds until the higher unemployment is eliminated.
Ball (1994) shows that a perfectly credible disinﬂation need have no adverse effects on
employment even in a model with considerable contractual inertia in the price level.
33 The Fed did not explicitly assert its responsibility for inﬂation in the initial announcements
of its disinﬂationary policy. However, by emphasizing the key role played by money growth in the
inﬂation process, and by announcing a change in operating procedures to emphasize the control
of money, the Fed implicitly acknowledged its responsibility for inﬂation. See Federal Reserve
Bulletin (November 1979), pp. 830–32.M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Comes of Age 13
achieving the low inﬂation objective. The unprecedented increases in short-
term interest rates that followed further demonstrated the Fed’s commitment
to reducing inﬂation.34
Nevertheless after two decades of rising inﬂation, a widespread skepticism
worked against Fed credibility.35 Wage and price setters doubted that there
would be sufﬁciently widespread public support for the Fed’s disinﬂation. In-
deed, the inﬂation was not broken until a sustained slowing of money growth
beginning in 1981 created a serious recession that tested the Fed’s determi-
nation and the public’s support.36 Although the recession was the worst since
the 1930s, it was less severe than might have been expected considering the
size of the accompanying disinﬂation. Most remarkable is that the roughly 6
percentage point disinﬂation occurred in just two years: 1981 and 1982. The
size and speed of the disinﬂation suggests that the acquisition of credibility
played a key role in making it happen.
5. MONETARY POLICY AT THE CLOSE OF THE
CENTURY: MAINTAINING LOW INFLATION
The Fed has succeeded in maintaining low inﬂation for almost 15 years now.
With luck the United States should enter the 21st century with inﬂation near
what it was under the gold standard at the opening of the 20th century.
Macroeconomic performance during the low inﬂation period has been good,
34 The Fed took short-term rates from around 11 percent in September 1979 to around 17
percent in April 1980. This was the most aggressive series of actions the Fed has ever taken in
so short a time, although the roughly 5 percent increase in short rates from January to September
of 1973 was almost as large. See Goodfriend (1993).
35 The collapse of conﬁdence in U.S. monetary policy in 1979 and 1980 was extraordinary.
The price of gold rose from around $275 per ounce in June 1979 to peak at about $850 per ounce
in January 1980, and it averaged over $600 per ounce as late as November 1980. Evidence of
a weakening economy caused the Fed to pause in its aggressive tightening in early 1980. But
with short rates relatively steady, the 30-year rate jumped sharply by around 2 percentage points
between December and February, signaling a huge jump in long-term inﬂation expectations. The
collapse of conﬁdence in early 1980 was caused in part by the ongoing oil price shock and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. But the Fed’s hesitation to proceed with its
tightening at the ﬁrst sign of a weakening economy probably also played a role. In any case, the
Fed responded with an unprecedented 3 percentage point increase in short rates in March, taking
them to around 17 percent. See Goodfriend (1993).
36 After making its disinﬂationary policy commitment in October 1979, the Fed let the
growth of effective M1 overshoot its target range in 1980 and the inﬂation rate continued to rise,
peaking at over 10 percent in the fourth quarter. Then, in sharp contrast to the preceding four
years, effective M1 actually undershot its target range in 1981. Effective M1 grew around 4.6
percentage points slower in 1981 than its average annual growth over the preceding ﬁve years.
Further, the actual 2 percent shortfall in M1 from the midpoint of its 1981 target was built into
the 1982 target path. See Broaddus and Goodfriend (1984).
The unemployment rate rose from around 6 percent in 1978 to average nearly 10 percent in
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especially when compared to the inﬂationary period preceding it. The only
recession during the period, in 1990–91, was mild by recent standards. Over
the period as a whole, employment growth has been strong and productivity
growth may have picked up somewhat. Moreover, both short- and long-term
interest rates are around one-third of what they averaged in the early 1980s
and are much less volatile too.
The promise of low inﬂation is being fulﬁlled. The challenge today is for
the Fed to understand the secret of its success. In that regard the low inﬂation
period has as much to teach as the traumatic period that preceded it. In review-
ing below the lessons learned and principles applied, we shall see that the best
way of assuring our continued monetary policy success would be for Congress
to give the Fed a legislative mandate for low inﬂation.
Lessons Learned and Principles Applied
One of the most important lessons learned from the last four decades is that
credibility for low inﬂation is the foundation of effective monetary policy. The
Fed has acquired credibility since the early 1980s by consistently taking policy
actions to hold inﬂation in check. In effect, the Fed has reestablished a mutual
understanding between itself and the markets. From this perspective, wage and
price setters keep their part of an implicit bargain by not inﬂating as long as
the Fed demonstrates its commitment to low inﬂation. Ironically, the Fed has
learned from nearly a century of experience to pursue rule-like behavior in
order to fully achieve the gains from moving away from the gold standard.
Experience shows that the guiding principle for monetary policy is to pre-
empt rising inﬂation. The go-stop policy experience teaches that waiting until
the public acknowledges rising inﬂation to be a problem is to wait too long. At
that point, the higher inﬂation becomes entrenched and must be counteracted
by corrective policy actions more likely to depress economic activity.
The main tactical problem for the Fed is to decide when preemptive policy
actions are necessary and how aggressive they should be. In this regard, the
Fed must be careful to consider any adverse effect that a poorly timed policy
tightening could have on employment and output. For that matter, the Fed
must be prepared to ease monetary policy when a weakening economy calls
for it. The central bank’s credibility depends not only on its inﬂation-ﬁghting
credentials but also on its perceived competence.
A natural starting point to balance these concerns is to use a policy rule-
of-thumb based on historical data to benchmark Fed policy. The stance and
direction of monetary policy can then be chosen in light of historical experience
conditioned on any special current circumstances. The most relevant histori-
cal experience is, of course, the relatively brief low inﬂation period since theM. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Comes of Age 15
mid-1980s. As the Fed extends low inﬂation over time, the nation will build
up a richer relevant history against which to benchmark policy.37
However, even our brief experience with low inﬂation contains useful in-
sights such as this. In some years, such as 1994, inﬂationary pressures might
be judged to call for a particularly aggressive preemptive tightening. At other
times, such as in 1996, there might be some concern about the potential for
rising inﬂation but enough doubt to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The Fed’s
success in 1994 and 1996 suggests that the key to effective management of
short-term interest rates over the business cycle is to move rates up decisively
and preemptively when warranted in order to build credibility for low inﬂation.
With credibility “in the bank,” so to speak, the Fed can hold rates steady or
move them down out of concern for unemployment at other times.38 The lesson
is that credibility enhances ﬂexibility.
A Legislative Mandate for Price Stability
Largely as a result of the common understanding of the theory and history of
monetary policy reviewed above, there is today a consensus among monetary
economists and central bankers that maintaining low inﬂation is the founda-
tion of effective monetary policy. Moreover, there is an emerging consensus
that a central bank’s commitment to price stability should be strengthened by
legislation making low inﬂation the primary goal of monetary policy.39
37 Simple policy rule speciﬁcations studied with models estimated on historical data can be of
great practical value in benchmarking actual policy decisions. McCallum (1988) and Taylor (1993)
present two rules, respectively, that are particularly useful in this regard. McCallum models the
monetary base (currency plus bank reserves) as the Fed’s policy instrument, and has it responding
to a moving average of base velocity and departures of nominal GDP from a target path. Taylor
models the real short-term interest rate (the market interest rate minus expected inﬂation) as the
policy instrument, and has it responding to inﬂation and the gap between actual and potential
GDP.
Each speciﬁcation has advantages and disadvantages. Taylor’s rule matches more closely
the way the Fed thinks of itself as operating. But McCallum’s rule makes clear that the ultimate
power of the Fed over the economy derives from its monopoly on the monetary base. McCallum’s
rule has the advantage that it could still be used if disinﬂation happened to push the market short
rate to zero, or if inﬂation expectations became excessively volatile. In either situation the Fed
might be unable to use the real short rate as its policy instrument.
38 See Board of Governors “Monetary Policy Report to Congress” (1994, 1995, and 1996).
39 In 1995, Senator Connie Mack introduced a bill that would make low inﬂation the primary
goal of monetary policy. In 1989, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan testiﬁed in favor of a prior
resolution that would have mandated a price stability objective for the Fed. Academics as diverse
as Blinder (1995), Fischer (1994), and Friedman (1962) all agree that the Fed should be given
some sort of mandate for low inﬂation. The remarkable convergence of professional thinking
in favor of a mandate was evident at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s August 1996
conference on price stability. See Achieving Price Stability (1996).
Inﬂation targeting is employed by a number of central banks around the world. See Leiderman
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The recommended priority for price stability derives not from any belief
in its intrinsic value relative to other goals such as full employment and eco-
nomic growth. Price stability should take priority for two reasons: ﬁrst, the Fed
actually has the power to guarantee it over the long run, and second, monetary
policy encourages employment and economic growth in the long run mostly
by controlling inﬂation.40 Also, and this is very important, a mandate for price
stability would not prevent the Fed from taking the kinds of policy actions it
takes today to stabilize employment and output in the short run. What it would
do is discipline the Fed to justify these actions against a commitment to protect
the purchasing power of money.
Two often-repeated objections to a mandate for low inﬂation deserve men-
tion here. One is the notion that low inﬂation targeting is largely irrelevant be-
cause two enormous oil price increases in the 1970s—in 1973/74 and 1979/80—
were responsible for the worst inﬂation of that period.41 The claim continues
that our success in controlling inﬂation will be determined by whether we
have large oil price shocks in the future or not. Clearly, oil price increases
create a problem for the economy: the higher price of oil diverts expenditure
to oil products and raises real costs throughout the economy, with adverse
consequences for demand and employment in non-oil sectors.
The economy must adjust to the higher real cost of oil in any case. The
problem for a central bank is to make sure that the adjustment problem is not
compounded with monetary instability. A central bank with a mandate for low
inﬂation is more likely to resist excessive monetary accommodation than one
with a weaker commitment to price stability. This is because an oil price shock
will be less likely to set in motion wage and price increases that the central
bank will be inclined to accommodate. The Fed was in just this predicament
when the 1970s oil price shocks hit, since rising inﬂation trends were already
well established before each oil shock. The destabilizing effects on inﬂation,
inﬂation expectations, and employment and output would almost surely have
been less troublesome in a climate of stable inﬂation.
A second objection to a mandate for low inﬂation is that it would hold
back economic growth. In fact, the opposite is more nearly true. In terms of
the earlier discussion of money demand and supply, trend growth of national
output continually raises the demand for money, and the Fed accommodates
the growing demand for money at stable prices.
Would monetary policy prevent the economy from growing faster if labor
productivity unexpectedly surged? Not for long, because unemployment would
begin to rise as businesses found that they could meet demand with less labor
40 Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994) report empirical evidence on inﬂation and productivity
growth. Dotsey and Ireland (1996) study the question in a quantitative, theoretical model.
41 Oil prices rose from around $3 to $12 a barrel during the 1973/74 oil price shock, and
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input. And the Fed would resist rising unemployment by easing monetary
policy to encourage faster growth in aggregate demand. In short, the Fed’s
policy procedures do not “target growth.” A mandate for price stability would
allow the Fed to naturally and automatically accommodate an increase in pro-
ductivity growth over time.
Ultimately the Fed can only secure full credibility for low inﬂation with the
backing of the public. The public’s misunderstanding of the tactics of monetary
policy is particularly troublesome. For instance, accusations that the Fed was
“busting ghosts” when it ran short-term interest rates up in 1994 threatened to
undermine support for policy actions that were clearly called for.42 Preemptive
policy actions in 1994 laid the foundation for continued economic expansion.
The task ahead must be to broaden and deepen the public’s understanding and
support for the strategy and tactics of monetary policy and to lock in credibility
for low inﬂation with a legislative mandate.
6. CONCLUSION
American monetary policy has come full circle in the 20th century. Early in
the century the nation overcame a long-standing distrust of government in-
tervention in the monetary system to establish a central bank. The Federal
Reserve embodied the idea that discretionary monetary policy could improve
on the rules of the gold standard, rules that were seen as unduly restrictive.
We now know that the faith then placed in discretion over rules was somewhat
misplaced. Today, monetary economists and central bankers alike understand
that effective monetary policy must be built on a consistent commitment to low
inﬂation.
Numerous lessons were learned on the 20th century odyssey. The most im-
portant is that the Federal Reserve, through its management of monetary policy,
is responsible for inﬂation. This became clear partly as a result of advances
in monetary theory and partly as a result of evidence on money demand and
money supply. It was also the result of a learning process in which nonmonetary
approaches to controlling inﬂation were seen to fail, and the monetary approach
succeeded.
Discretionary monetary policy actions can be invaluable in ﬁghting a ﬁ-
nancial crisis or a weak economy. But we learned that the promise of discretion
can be realized fully only in the context of a monetary policy that makes price
stability a priority. Otherwise discretion leads inexorably to go-stop policy that
brings rising and unstable inﬂation and inﬂation expectations, with adverse
consequences for interest rates and employment.
42 See Thurow (1994). By successfully keeping inﬂation in check, preemptive policy actions
necessarily appear to be busting ghosts. So the appearance of ghost busting is a consequence of
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The go-stop experience taught that the Fed should ﬁght inﬂation by tight-
ening monetary policy before price pressures break out into the open. Waiting
until inﬂation has begun to rise may better assure public support for higher
short-term interest rates. But delayed tightening allows higher inﬂation to
become more ﬁrmly established, requiring even higher rates to choke it off,
with a greater risk of recession.
An emerging consensus among monetary economists and central bankers
supports the need for a legislative mandate to make low inﬂation the primary
goal of monetary policy. That recommendation has broad backing for three
reasons. A central bank can guarantee low inﬂation over time. Monetary policy
most effectively stabilizes employment over the business cycle when it has
credibility for low inﬂation. And full credibility for low inﬂation needs the
support of a legislative mandate.
Monetary policy has come of age in the 20th century in the sense that
monetary economists and central bankers have come to terms with the past—
lessons have been learned and principles have been applied successfully. The
country should build on that professional consensus to broaden the public’s un-
derstanding and support for price stability and the preemptive policy procedures
to sustain low inﬂation. The nation has the opportunity to bring a tumultuous
chapter in its monetary history to a close. It should grasp that opportunity and
enjoy the beneﬁts that sustained price stability would bring.
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